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Abstract 
 
In antitrust rule of reason cases, courts weigh anticompetitive harm against consumer 
welfare offsets.  In sports cases, the courts appear to accept claims that fans prefer more 
competitive balance to less, so that a potential welfare offset is any added enhanced 
competitive balance attributable to the anticompetitive activity.  In addition, courts often 
decide that less intrusive alternatives may be available to accomplish the same 
competitive balance gain.  From the applied theory perspective, this is troublesome. 
Theoretically, whether fans prefer more balance is a hypothesis about preferences that 
needs to be examined in detail for any particular case.  Applied theory also is of aid in 
assessing whether a particular device under scrutiny, including so-called less intrusive 
alternatives, should even be predicted to enhance balance.  Wading through the foregoing 
produces food for thought for the courts. 
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I.  Introduction 
In pro sports league antitrust cases, courts in the past have presumed that sports fans 
prefer more competitive balance to less.1  The cases involved the draft, free agency 
restrictions, restrictions on the number of local TV broadcasts, and centralized league 
marketing of individual franchise intellectual property.  This belief allowed defendants to 
argue that increased competitive balance generated by these impositions is a welfare-
offset against their potentially anti-competitive effects.  In the context of sports, the harm 
is to sports fans, the final consumer, as is the point of all antitrust actions. 
In such cases, the courts have adopted the rule of reason approach embodied in the 
question, “Does the welfare from improved competitive balance offset the harm to fans 
and/or athletes?”  The rule of reason approach involves some well-established steps.  
Plaintiff must establish the market definition and demonstrate the anti-competitive harm.  
Defendant must demonstrate the balance-improving offset. The courts also consider 
whether there is any alternative that could accomplish the same outcome with less harm 
to fans. 
In this paper, I hope to make two points.  First, the idea that fans prefer more 
competitive balance to less is a hypothesis about preferences.2  As such, it must be 
checked in every instance.  An analogy about preferences, from demand theory, is that 
                                                 
1 Rottenberg (1956) originally argued that if fans care about balance then the level of competitive balance 
is an object of careful management by sports leagues. 
2 Indeed, Rottenberg’s (1956) original observation on this point was stated just this way and has been taken 
up in the sports economics literature under the label of the “uncertainty of outcome hypothesis”.  See the 
references in a later section of the paper. 
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the same good can be income normal for some people but income inferior for others.  
Presuming the income effects were the same, qualitatively, for all people would surely 
lead to unexpected outcomes in policy decisions about such goods. 
Second, although courts often take as given that some mechanism has the chance to 
improve competitive balance, applied theory may predict otherwise.  Under fairly general 
theoretical assumptions, in North American leagues, theory predicts that national 
television revenue sharing, the draft, and local revenue sharing will not enhance 
competitive balance.  On the other hand, in the same leagues, a payroll cap may do so in a 
particular setting, and a competitive balance tax will do so. 
Theory is also useful in pointing out that all mechanisms under scrutiny will result 
in wealth transfers.  In the pro sports context, the transfers can be from owners to players, 
from some owners to other owners, and/or from some players to other players.  On the 
one hand, this aspect of the theory is important in separating wheat from chaff.  Typically 
transfers are beside the point since harm done to consumers by inefficiency is the point of 
antitrust action.  But on the other hand, as courts wrestle with fairness, sometimes it is 
difficult to get past the transfers and focus on competitive balance.  Theory helps here. 
The foregoing suggests both caution and a simple prescription in rule of reason 
sports cases.  First, the court should ascertain whether and how much fans care about 
balance in the case at hand.  This is no trivial matter since it should be done in 
comparison to some idea of “optimal” balance, competitively determined.  Second, the 
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court should entertain sound economic theory in deciding whether the mechanism under 
discussion is predicted to improve balance in the first place.  Along the way, theory 
reveals wealth transfers to the court that tend to weigh into their decision as well. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, a (surely non-exhaustive) list of court 
cases is offered to demonstrate the identified problems.  Section III addresses whether or 
not sports fans actually do prefer more balance to less along with the observation that the 
observed level of competitive balance in any particular court case is probably not the one 
that would be competitively determined.   Section IV uses the latest developments in the 
theory of sports leagues applied to revenue sharing.  A simple episode analysis fails to 
reject the theoretical prediction that revenue sharing does not improve balance in North 
American leagues.  Conclusions round out the paper, including the summary prescription 
for rule of reason analysis. 
II.  Example Cases and Implications 
This section is based heavily on McKeown (2011) and Wilken (2014).  For pro 
sports leagues, the relevant chronological list of cases includes:3 
• Mackey v. NFL, 1976 (Mackey)—Challenged the validity of the “Rozelle Rule” in 
the NFL.4  
                                                 
3 I’m no lawyer, so simply repeat the legal references I’ve seen.  Mackey:  Mackey v. Nat‘l Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976).  Smith:  Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978).  NCAA:  Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98, 110–11 n.42 
(1984).  Chicago Pro Sports: Chi. Prof‘l Sports Ltd. P‘ship. v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 874 F. Supp. 844, 
861 (N.D. Ill. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).  Salvino:  Major League Baseball 
Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 340 (2d Cir. 2008).  American Needle: Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l 
Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) and Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l Football League, 130 S. 
Ct. 2201 (2010). 
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• Smith v. NFL, 1978 (Smith)—Challenged rules of the NFL draft. 
• NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 1984 (NCAA)—
Challenged centralized broadcasting of regular season college football by the 
NCAA. 
• Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 1996 (Chicago Pro 
Sports)—Challenged restrictions on team TV broadcasting imposed by the NBA. 
• MLB Properties Inc. v. Salvino, 2008 (Salvino)—Challenged centralized 
marketing by MLB. 
• American Needle v. NFL, 2010 (American Needle)—Challenged centralized 
marketing by the NFL. 
Except for Mackey, these were rule of reason cases.5  Let’s just skip over the first 
steps—defining the market and the arguments about anti-competitive harm and welfare 
enhancing offsets.  The focus in this paper is on the behavior of the court in the 
subsequent steps—deciding the balance of harm and welfare generated and offering less 
intrusive alternatives. 
First, the courts made known that they believe fans care about competitive balance 
and so balance becomes an object of management by leagues: 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The Rozelle Rule required owners receiving a free agent player to compensate the owner losing that 
player.  If the two teams could not agree on compensation, the NFL Commissioner chose it.  Sports 
economists pretty much agree that the size of the compensation required under the rule effectively 
precluded meaningful player movement.  Teams at the time voiced this was because they feared the size of 
the compensation that would be set by the Commissioner (Garvey, 1989). 
5 Technically, the court struck down the Rozelle Rule as a per se violation, rather than under rule of reason, 
but it is the court’s belief about fan preferences for balance that matters for the points in this paper. 
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• Mackey (McKeown, 2011, p. 534, quote in the Mackey decision): “…the NFL has 
a strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams.” 
• Salvino (McKeown, 2011, p. 537, quote in the Salvino decision):  The court 
conceded “that competitive balance is a necessary ingredient in the continuing 
popularity of the MLB Entertainment Product.” 
• American Needle (McKeown, 2011, p. 520, quote in the American Needle 
decision):  “While that same interest [from NCAA: maintaining competitive 
balance] applies to the teams in the NFL, it does not justify treating them as a 
single entity for §1 [Section 1 of the Sherman Act] purposes when it comes to the 
marketing of the teams’ individually owned intellectual property.” [Bracket 
clarifications by yours truly.] 
Moving on to beliefs about the validity of revenue sharing, usually as a less 
intrusive option, we get the following. 
• Smith (Wilken, 2014, p. 91, quote in the Smith decision):  “The least restrictive 
alternative of all, of course, would be for the NFL to eliminate the draft entirely 
and employ revenue-sharing to equalize the teams’ financial resources [as] a 
method of preserving ‘competitive balance’ nicely in harmony with the league’s 
self-proclaimed ‘joint-venture’ status.” 
• Chicago Pro Sports (McKeown, p. 537, his quote):  “The district court noted that 
the league had other mechanisms, including the college draft, revenue sharing, 
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and team salary caps, to more directly promote competitive balance.”  Emphasis 
by yours truly. 
• Salvino (Wilken, 2014, p. 91, quote in the Salvino decision):  The court noted that 
“disproportionate distribution of licensing income would foster a competitive 
imbalance” among MLB teams. 
Thus, the courts proceeded as follows.  First, they followed the idea that some 
league behavior caused fan harm but also might improve competitive balance.  In doing 
so, they took as their starting position that fans prefer more balance to less.  But what if 
that simply was not so in the case at hand? 
The courts have also found that the league did not provide a convincing argument 
that the policy was essential to balance.  Now, one might simply fault the leagues for a 
weak argument.  However, part of the court consideration could have involved the 
powerful insight that theory does not predict that the particular mechanism under analysis 
would improve balance in the first place. 
Courts have also offered in their opinion that there were other less intrusive 
mechanisms that would accomplish balance, most notably, revenue sharing.  On this tack, 
the theory and evidence may suggest that the court simply missed the mark—theory 
applied to North American sports leagues predicts that revenue sharing will not have any 
impact on balance at all.  The next sections present these criticisms, seriatim. 
III.  The Issue of Competitive Balance 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Rottenberg (1956) was the first to discuss competitive balance using what sports 
economists now refers to as “the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis”—fans prefer their 
team to win, but in close games, and fans want at least occasional hopes of post-season 
play for their team.  Imbalanced game and season outcomes run directly counter to this 
hypothesized fan preference.  As a result, if a league suffers problematic imbalance, fans 
of perennial losers will lose interest in their teams. 
This wouldn’t matter to the rest of the team owners if these fans kept their same 
level of enthusiasm for the rest of the league and the league’s post-season play.  But if 
fans of perennial losers also fall-off from the league entirely, all owners are worse off.  
The implication is that leagues have a vested interest in the level of competitive balance. 
As mentioned earlier, Rottenberg’s is a hypothesis about fan preferences.  Since 
preferences vary, just how much (if any) some fans (if any) prefer more competitive 
balance to less is an empirical question.  Early reviews of the work on the impact of 
competitive balance on demand concluded that the empirical veracity of the uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis had been repeatedly called into question.6  Works that followed 
examined specific leagues at particular times or the entire historical time series of the 
impact of competitive balance on attendance for leagues.  The former found the 
hypothesis carried empirical weight only at times, and only for some particular types of 
                                                 
6 Szymanski (2003) and Fort (2006). 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
 8 
outcome uncertainty.7  The latter found that only some types of outcome uncertainty 
seem to matter and only for some sports, not all.8 
At best, the extant work on whether and how much fans care about balance finds 
mixed results at best.  This seems less than a sound foundation for the courts’ inherent 
belief that fans care about balance in general.  Instead, the results suggest a case-by-case 
assessment of the belief, league by league. 
But attempting to quantity the relationship between observed competitive balance 
and demand is not enough.  Empirical estimation of whether and how much fans care 
about balance in any situation can only use data on the levels of competitive balance fans 
have faced.  The added dimension is, of course, whether that level, itself, has the welfare 
characteristics ascribed to a competitive determination of the level of competitive 
balance. 
At this point in time, for North American leagues, only the theoretical work has 
been done on this issue under the economist’s heading of “optimal balance”.  Leagues 
where single-game tickets dominate, like MLB, are the most complex (Fort and Quirk, 
2010).  The conditions for optimal balance involve the sum of changes in fan and owner 
surpluses across all opponents and compared between smaller- and larger-revenue 
                                                 
7 For example, comparing between uncertainty of individual game outcomes, uncertainty of the final season 
standings, uncertainty of access to the playoffs, and uncertainty of outcome across seasons (dynasties).  See 
Meehan, Nelson & Richardson (2007); Rascher & Solmes (2007); Soebbing (2008); Davis (2009); and 
Tainsky & Winfree (2010). 
8 Lee & Fort (2008) and Mills & Fort (2014). 
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markets.  Things are decidedly simpler for leagues dominated by season-ticket sales like 
the NFL (Fort and Quirk, 2011). 
According to the usual criterion of maximizing the sum of owner and fan welfare, 
under competition, it ends up that optimal balance is 1) quite unlikely to hold in any 
actual league, 2) ultimately an empirical issue, and 3) completely amenable to the usual 
analysis had by estimating the characteristics of fan demand and of ticket pricing choices 
by team owners.  It is not unusual in antitrust cases for expert witnesses to do such 
estimation, especially given the chance to obtain the required data during the discovery 
phase of trial that are typically otherwise unobtainable. 
IV.  Basic Theory and Revenue Sharing 
The goal of this section is to shed applied theory light on whether the courts’ 
favorite less intrusive alternative, revenue sharing, can alter competitive balance.  
Generally, in pro sports, geographic variation in fan willingness to pay for team quality 
determines imbalance in a league.  This has weakened a bit over time with the advent of 
cable/satellite and streaming options for fans but still holds generally true.  Willingness-
to-pay varies geographically by income, population, substitute consumption opportunities 
and (perhaps more so than for other types of consumption) preferences.  In the theory 
literature on team talent choice, resulting in the distribution of talent in a league that 
manifests itself in competitive balance, simply including both “larger” and “smaller” 
revenue team owners incorporates this geographical difference. 
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Presentation of the expected impacts of revenue sharing is easily facilitated without 
loss of (much) generality for “closed” North American leagues under the assumption of 
no scale effects (talent is measured so that a unit increase in talent results in a unit 
increase in winning percentage).  This is easiest to carry out using the two-team theory 
from Winfree & Fort (2012) (suitably restricted as just stated) and the two-team league 
diagram popularized by Quirk & Fort (1992).9 
With subscript L and S for the larger-revenue and smaller-revenue owners, 
respectively, winning percent depends on the level of talent chosen by each owner, 
𝑤𝐿 = 𝑤𝐿(𝑡𝐿 , 𝑡𝑆) and 𝑤𝑆 = 𝑤𝑆(𝑡𝐿 , 𝑡𝑆).  Nash conjectures give 𝜕𝑡𝐿𝜕𝑡𝑆 = 0.  In addition, the 
assumption of no scale effects gives  𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
= 1. The adding-up constraint for league 
play requires 𝑤𝐿 = 1− 𝑤𝑆.  This last also means that 𝜕𝑤𝐿𝜕𝑡𝐿 = −𝜕𝑤𝑆𝜕𝑡𝑆  and, coupled with the 
assumption of no scale effects, that 𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
= −1. 
Absent any intervention to change the talent distribution, the two owners have the 
following profits: 
(1)  𝜋𝐿 = 𝑅𝐿[𝑤𝐿(𝑡𝐿, 𝑡𝑆)]− 𝑃𝑡𝐿 and 𝜋𝑆 = 𝑅𝑆[𝑤𝑆(𝑡𝐿 , 𝑡𝑆)]− 𝑃𝑡𝑆, 
                                                 
9 Issues abound with this choice in the broader context of the sports league theory applied to other leagues 
(e.g., world football) but the choices facilitate a clear statement of the issue.  See Szymanski (2004) and 
Szymanski & Kesenne (2004) for the initial critique of Fort & Quirk (1995), and the subsequent exchange 
between Eckard (2006) and Szymanski (2006).  Fort & Quirk (2007) and Fort & Winfree (2009) further 
explore the impacts of the restrictions in the North American model vis a vis open and closed talent 
markets and contest success functions.  Winfree & Fort (2012) later offer a general theory presentation 
aimed at bringing all of the previous under a single unified formulation.  A later exchange is in Szymanski 
(2013) and Winfree & Fort (2013).  Madden (2015) also entered the fray. 
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where R is revenue and P is the competitively determined price per unit talent.10  First-
order conditions are: 
(2)  𝜕𝑅𝐿
𝜕𝑤𝐿
�
𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
� − 𝑃 = 0 and 𝜕𝑅𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
�
𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
+ 𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
� − 𝑃 = 0. 
However, 𝜕𝑡𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
= 𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 0 for Nash conjectures (which also eliminates consideration of the 
implication of the adding-up constraint), and 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
= 1 with no scale effects so that 
the first order conditions become: 
(3)  𝑀𝑅𝐿 − 𝑃 = 0 and 𝑀𝑅𝑆 − 𝑃 = 0, 
where 𝑀𝑅𝐿 = 𝜕𝑅𝐿𝜕𝑤𝐿 and 𝑀𝑅𝑆 = 𝜕𝑅𝑆𝜕𝑤𝑆. 
Nash equilibrium in the competitive talent market sets the first-order conditions 
equal to each other (depicted in Figure 1): 
(4)  𝑀𝑅𝐿 = 𝑃∗ = 𝑀𝑅𝑆. 
Thus, the equilibrium distribution of talent is 𝑤𝐿∗ = 1− 𝑤𝑆∗, with price per unit talent 
equal to P*.  Clearly, by virtue only of the fact that there is a larger-revenue and a 
smaller-revenue owner, talent imbalance occurs, 𝑤𝐿∗ > 𝑤𝑆∗.  In addition, the remaining 
symptom due to the presence of different market values occurs, namely, payroll 
imbalance with 𝑃∗𝑤𝐿∗ > 𝑃∗𝑤𝑆∗. 
Historically, the first form of revenue sharing included only gate revenues from ticket 
                                                 
10 The model side steps the entire issue of the determination of the price of talent.  It would be more correct 
to consider price determination as the result of a tatonnement process in this model, rather than as an 
assumption that the price of talent is constant. 
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sales.11  The earliest version involved simple equal-proportion sharing.  Under this 
mechanism, gate revenue proceeds are divided between the home and visitor by the same 
proportion for all teams.  Let α be the share kept by the home team.  Profits for our two 
team owners are now (suppressing the notation for the elements determining revenues): 
(5)  𝜋𝐿 = 𝛼𝑅𝐿 + (1− 𝛼)𝑅𝑆 − 𝑃𝑡𝐿 and 𝜋𝐿 = 𝛼𝑅𝑆 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑅𝐿 − 𝑃𝑡𝑆. 
The first-order condition for the larger-revenue owner is: 
(6)  𝛼 𝜕𝑅𝐿
𝜕𝑤𝐿
�
𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
�+ (1− 𝛼) 𝜕𝑅𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
�
𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
+ 𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
� − 𝑃 = 0. 
However, imposing Nash conjectures and no scale effects, and noting that the adding up 
constraint gives  𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜕𝑡𝐿
= 𝜕𝑤𝐿
𝜕𝑡𝑆
= −1, expression (6) becomes: 
(7)  𝛼𝑀𝑅𝐿 − (1− 𝛼)𝑀𝑅𝑆 − 𝑃 = 0. 
Using the same steps to find the first-order condistion for the smaller-revenue 
owner, and using the expressin in (7), Nash equilibrium is characterized by: 
(8)  𝛼𝑀𝑅𝐿 − (1− 𝛼)𝑀𝑅𝑆 = 𝑃′ = 𝛼𝑀𝑅𝑆 − (1− 𝛼)𝑀𝑅𝐿.  
Note that as long as  𝑀𝑅𝐿 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆 in the neighborhood of  𝑃′, then 𝑃′ < 𝑃∗ , since 
𝑀𝑅𝐿 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆 ⟺ 𝑃∗ > 𝑃′.  However, a bit of algebra shows that this equlibrium must also 
satisfy 𝑀𝑅𝐿 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆.  Thus, the distribution of talent must be identical to the case of no 
                                                 
11 National TV contracts are between the league and media providers rather than between individual 
owners and media providers.  In all cases where there is a national contract, all owners regardless of their 
choice of talent share the proceeds equally.  Thus, these are lump-sum payments to owners and they cannot 
impact competitive balance. 
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revenue sharing, above, namely, 𝑤𝐿∗ = 1− 𝑤𝑆∗.12 
All that happens with equal-proportion revenue sharing is that the price of talent 
falls and, along with it, payrolls.  Indeed, the entire amount of revenue sharing comes out 
of players’ pockets since the shift downward in the marginal value of talent is identical to 
the decline in the price of talent.  A more detailed demonstration is added to the 
following presentation of modern pooled revenue sharing. 
Eventually, leagues adopted pooled sharing, including other attendance-related 
revenue and, eventually, extended to include local TV revenue.  Under this form of 
sharing, owners keep some percentage β and put the rest into a pool that is shared equally 
by all owners.  For our two-team league, profits for the larger- and smaller-revenue 
owners, respectively, are (again, suppressing the notation on the determinants of 
revenue): 
(9)  𝜋𝐿 = 𝛽𝑅𝐿 + �1−𝛽2 � (𝑅𝐿 + 𝑅𝑆) − 𝑃𝑡𝐿 and 𝜋𝑆 = 𝛽𝑅𝑆 + �1−𝛽2 � (𝑅𝐿 + 𝑅𝑆)− 𝑃𝑡𝑆. 
Again, with Nash conjectures, no scale effects, and under the adding up constraint, 
the first-order condition for the larger-revenue market owner is: 
(10)  𝛽𝑀𝑅𝐿 + �1−𝛽2 � (𝑀𝑅𝐿 −𝑀𝑅𝑆)− 𝑃 = 0. 
By the same steps for the smaller-revenue owner, and using the result in expression (10), 
Nash equilibrium is characterized by: 
                                                 
12 This result is Rottenberg’s (1956) “invariance principle” that the distribution of talent will not vary based 
on the rules that determine the distribution of player marginal revenue product between owners and players.  
The relationship between this invariance principle and the famous straw man theorem in Coase (1959, 
1960) is covered by Fort (2005). 
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(11)  𝛽𝑀𝑅𝐿 + �1−𝛽2 � (𝑀𝑅𝐿 −𝑀𝑅𝑆) = 𝑃′′ = 𝛽𝑀𝑅𝑆 + �1−𝛽2 � (𝑀𝑅𝑆 −𝑀𝑅𝐿).  
Suppose 𝛼 = 𝛽 so that only the sharing arrangement is different, but not the share kept 
by the home team.  It is easy to see that, again, as long as  𝑀𝑅𝐿 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆 in the 
neighborhood of  𝑃′′, then 𝑃′′ < 𝑃′ < 𝑃∗ , since 𝑀𝑅𝐿 > 𝑀𝑅𝑆 ⟺ 𝑃∗ > 𝑃′ > 𝑃′′. 
Again, a bit of algebra shows that this equlibrium must also satisfy 𝑀𝑅𝐿 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆.  
Thus, the distribution of talent must be identical to the case of either equal-proportion or 
no revenue sharing, above, namely, 𝑤𝐿∗ = 1− 𝑤𝑆∗.  So the price of talent and payroll fall 
and revenue sharing comes entirely out of players’ pockets.  The case where 𝛼 = 𝛽 so 
that  𝑃′′ < 𝑃′ < 𝑃∗ is assured, is also shown in Figure 2. 
Tracking the redistribution due to revenue sharing is facilitated by Figure 3, just for 
pooled revenue sharing.  Participation in the pooled sharing scheme alters the marginal 
value of talent for the two owners as just shown in Figure 2, repeated in Figure 3.  But 
what are the net impacts on the two owners and on talent? 
For the owners, first, the pre-sharing surplus enjoyed from talent is ∆abg for the 
larger-revenue owner and ∆ebj for the smaller-revenue owner.  Since the shift in price of 
talent is 𝑏𝑐��� which is identical to 𝑎𝑑���� or 𝑒𝑓���, the surplus enjoyed in the presence of pooling 
is the same as before it was implemented!  ∆dch = ∆abg for the larger-revenue owner and 
∆fck = ∆ebj for the smaller-revenue owner.  Thus, the payroll reductions become the 
source of the shared revenues, that is, area abcd = area gbch for the larger-revenue owner 
and area ebcf =  area jbck for the smaller-revenue owner.  So talent surpluses remain the 
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same and the distribution of talent is the same so profits from team operation for each 
owner are the same. 
Second, for the owners, each also in addition recieves an equal share of the revenue 
sharing pool, namely, half of the area gjkh.  The “equal sharing” gives an appearance that 
the larger-revenue owner transferred money to the smaller-revenue owner; the former put 
in more than they take out, and the reverse for the latter.  But the demonstration makes 
clear that this pool came completely from players.  Presumably, deciding to split the pool 
evenly fosters league harmony. 
Just to tie up the loose end in the coverage, players are clearly worse off.  The price 
per unit talent has fallen.  Payrolls are smaller for players on both teams by the amount of 
the revenue sharing.  Pre-sharing payrolls were larger than payrolls under pooled sharing; 
𝑃∗𝑤𝐿
∗ > 𝑃′′𝑤𝐿∗ and 𝑃∗𝑤𝑆∗ > 𝑃′′𝑤𝑆∗ for players on the larger-revenue and smaller-revenue 
teams, respectively. 
To make the basic point in the literature on the impact of revenue sharing on 
balance, the behavior of one measure of one type of balance is offered.  The examination 
proceeds using a well-known measure of end-of-season balance by Noll (1988), Scully 
(1989), and the rigor in Fort & Quirk (1992, 1995).  The measure is the “ratio of actual to 
idealized standard deviation of winning percent,” or RSD. 
Let ASD be the actual standard deviation of winning percent outcomes at the end of 
a league’s season.  Let ISD be the “idealized” standard deviation for a league where the 
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probability that any team beats any other is literally 0.5.  For a league where ties count as 
one-half a win, from the simple binomial distribution, 𝐼𝑆𝐷 = 0.5
√𝐺
, where G is the number 
of games in a season (see Fort, 2007, for more on the issue with ties and with point 
systems used in the NHL and world sports leagues).  Given these definitions, 𝑅𝑆𝐷 = 𝐴𝑆𝐷
𝐼𝑆𝐷
.  
Thus, RSD contains both the number of teams and the number of games in a season so 
that either changes over time or differences between leagues is counted.  An actual league 
looks more and more like one form of a balanced league defined by ISD as 𝑅𝑆𝐷 → 1. 
The behavior of RSD is shown for all four major North American leagues in Figure 
4.  In what follows, the five-year average RSD before a given policy is compared to the 
five-year average after the policy is implemented.13  Lacking anything about the 
distribution of these averages, a formal test of means is passed over in favor of simply 
choosing 10 percent as a reasonable significant change. 
The history of revenue sharing events to be examined is in Table 1.  The results in 
Table 2 show general conformity to the theoretical predictions.  There were only 
insignificant impacts on balance in the original pooled sharing approach in both MLB 
(1996, both leagues) and later in the NFL (2001).  While the 20 percent is “significant” 
                                                 
13 The revenue sharing rules in the 2005-06 NHL agreement were inscrutable to me and I omit analysis of 
hockey. 
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for the AL in 2002, it is a decrease in balance, not an increase, evidence actually counter 
to any claims of improved balance through revenue sharing.14 
V.  Conclusions:  A Brief Prescription 
What does this mean for the courts?  First, the belief that fans care about balance, 
underpinning defendant arguments that there can be a competitive balance offset that 
enhances fan welfare, should be assessed in every case.  Depending on the league, time 
period, and type of competitive balance measure, it may not be true.  And that assessment 
should include a comparison relative to the “optimal” (surplus maximizing, competitively 
determined) level of balance.  In some cases, there may not actually be any foundation 
supporting defendants’ claims that competitive balance offsets increase for fan welfare. 
Second, both the theory and the data are in congruence about the impacts of 
revenue sharing on competitive balance—it is not predicted to change competitive 
balance and, by one empirical examination, it has not done so.  This means that one of the 
favorite less intrusive alternatives actually does not offer the believed improvement in 
balance.  The courts should be careful in the choice of less intrusive alternatives. 
Finally, courts also wrestle with fairness.  Theoretical identification of the transfers 
that can be expected to occur, while not really the meat of the antitrust grinder, does shed 
                                                 
14 Caveats abound.  Just in baseball, the original imposition of the reserve clause occurred in the year prior 
to topsy-turvy economic competition among four different leagues from 1882-1891.  Free agency in 1976 
occurred on the heels of expansion in both the American League (AL) and the National League (NL) in 
1969.  The first implementation of expanded local revenue sharing (beyond simple gate sharing) was 
sandwiched between the expansions of 1993 and 1998.  In addition, other dimensions of outcome 
uncertainty are also interesting, but there is only so much room in a given contribution. 
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light on the motivations of plaintiffs and defendants.  Leagues appear to use revenue 
sharing to transfer from players to owners, and to share the proceeds equally, even though 
the savings are larger for larger revenue market owners.  Thus, one of the most 
referenced, less intrusive alternatives poses fairness issues to wrestle with as well. 
If the courts keep these three conclusions in mind, the results of rule of reason 
approaches to sports antitrust issues will be the better for it. 
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Figure 1. 
Equilibrium in a Closed League 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Pooled Revenue Sharing Equilibrium in a Closed League 
$ $ 
MRL 
MRS 
MRL = P* MRS = P* 
WL = 0, WS = 1  WL = 1, WS = 0  WL* = 1 – WS* 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
 25 
 
Figure 3. 
Diagrammatic Exposition of Payroll Redistribution 
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Figure 4. 
End-of-Season Competitive Balance in the Major North American Leagues. 
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Table 1. 
History of Events. 
League Rev. Sharing 
MLB 1996, 2002 
NFL 2001 
NHL 2005-06 
 
Notes:  MLB pooled revenue sharing first in operation for the 1996 season and extended 
with higher rates 2002.  The NFL version also is pooled sharing.  The NHL version is 
difficult to decipher from its CBA. 
 
 
Table 2. 
History of Events and Percentage Change in Competitive Balance. 
Policy MLB  NFL 
Revenue Sharing AL NL  
1996 5.5% 0.7%  
2001   0.1% 
Revenue Sharing and 
Luxury Tax  
 
 
2002 20.0% –5.1%  
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